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CHARLES ABRAMSON, RICK L. ANDREWS, IMRAN S. CURRIM, and 
MORGAN JONES*
Over the past two decades, validation of choice models has focused on
predictive validity rather than parameter bias. In real-world validation of
choice models, true parameter values are unknown, so examination of
parameter bias is not possible. In contrast, the main focus of this study is
parameter bias in simulated scanner-panel choice data with known
parameter values. Study of parameter bias enables the assessment of a
fundamental issue not addressed in the choice modeling literature—the
extent to which the logit choice model is capable of distinguishing unob-
served effects that give rise to persistence in observed choices (e.g., het-
erogeneity and state dependence). Although econometric theory provides
some information about the causes of bias, the extent of such bias in typ-
ical scanner data applications remains unclear. The authors present an
extensive simulation study that provides information on the extent of bias
resulting from the misspecification of four unobserved effects that receive
frequent attention in the literature—choice set effects, heterogeneity in
preferences and market response, state dependence, and serial correla-
tion. The authors outline implications for model builders and managers. In
general, the potential for parameter bias in choice model applications
appears to be high. Overall, a logit model with choice set effects and the
Guadagni–Little loyalty variable produces the most valid parameter 
estimates.
Parameter Bias from Unobserved Effects in
the Multinomial Logit Model of Consumer
Choice
Beginning with the pioneering application by Guadagni
and Little (1983), many methodological advancements have
been made on fitting choice models for frequently pur-
chased products to supermarket scanner data. For example,
researchers have given an increasing amount of attention to
habit persistence (e.g., Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996),
state dependence (e.g., Erdem 1996; Keane 1997; Roy,
Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996), unobserved heterogeneity in
consumer preferences (e.g., Ailawadi, Gedenk, and Neslin
1997; Chintagunta, Jain, and Vilcassim 1991; Currim 1981;
Fader and Lattin 1993; Gupta and Chintagunta 1994; Jones
and Landwehr 1988; Kamakura and Russell 1989), response
to marketing mix (e.g., Currim, Meyer, and Le 1988; Gönül
and Srinivasan 1993; Jain, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta
1994), and choice sets (e.g., Andrews and Manrai 1998a, b;
Andrews and Srinivasan 1995; Bronnenberg and
Vanhonacker 1996; Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan 1999;
Siddarth, Bucklin, and Morrison 1995). Typically, only
information on consumers’ purchase histories and demo-
graphic characteristics, the purchase environment facing
consumers, and current choices are available to the analyst
modeling choice behavior. These effects are largely unob-
servable with scanner-panel data.
One fundamental issue is the extent to which choice mod-
els are capable of distinguishing such unobservable effects.
For example, consider heterogeneity and state dependence
(Heckman 1981a, b). Consumers may make repeat pur-
chases of brands either because previous choice outcomes
affect current choices (state dependence) or simply because
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consumers have strong preferences for certain brands (het-
erogeneity). Likewise, choice set effects (see Andrews and
Manrai 1998a, b) could be another explanation for persist-
ence in choices. If consumers consider their most preferred
brands, as suggested by Horowitz and Louviere (1995), then
heterogeneous choice sets and heterogeneous preferences
may be confounded. If consumers consider only previously
purchased brands, as suggested by Siddarth, Bucklin, and
Morrison (1995), then choice set heterogeneity and state
dependence may be confounded. Furthermore, habit persist-
ence (Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996) and heterogene-
ity in preferences (Heckman 1981a, b) are believed to result
in serial correlation in the residuals and therefore may be
empirically indistinguishable. In summary, there may be
several unobserved explanations for observed patterns of
persistent choices. Intuition suggests that it may not be pos-
sible for choice models to identify correctly the underlying
cause of persistence in choices, which may result in spuri-
ous habit, state dependence, preference heterogeneity, or
choice set effects.
Although the potential for spurious identification of
unobserved effects has been recognized for some time, no
one has attempted to study these identification issues care-
fully in simulated settings resembling typical scanner-panel
data sets. Because newer, more sophisticated choice models
are typically validated using scanner-panel data, true values
of parameters that underlie the choice process are unknown.
Consequently, researchers have relied on how well models
fit the data, validation sample hit rates, and significance of
parameter estimates to validate their models. Parameter bias
could not be examined with scanner-panel data sets.
In contrast, we focus on parameter bias. Why is the effect
of misspecified unobserved components on parameter bias
important? Imagine an applied analyst, in a company set-
ting, who is faced with a household-level scanner-panel data
set on brand choice in a frequently purchased product cate-
gory. Given the proliferation of models in the literature, how
should the analyst estimate a model that will permit an accu-
rate representation of the effects of intrinsic brand prefer-
ences, price, promotion, and loyalty on brand choice? Do all
potential unobservable effects need to be modeled? Can the
models be simplified without risk? In other words, are some
effects more important than others? Is this contingent on the
objective of the data analyst (prediction versus explanation
of consumer behavior based on parameter estimates)? If cer-
tain effects are not modeled, will other parameter estimates
be biased? Are these biases expected to be small or large in
magnitude? To what extent could such biases affect price
and promotion decisions? Although econometric theory pro-
vides guidance on the effect of misspecification on parame-
ter bias, the actual extent of bias in typical scanner data
applications remains unclear.
In addition to parameter bias, incorrect identification of
unobserved effects could have other important conse-
quences for marketing managers. First, spurious effects pro-
duce misleading conclusions about the nature of consumers’
decision processes and therefore lead to inappropriate mar-
keting strategies. For example, if spurious choice set effects
are identified, managers may incorrectly focus on methods
of gaining consideration of their brand (e.g., point-of-
purchase displays) when, in reality, consideration of their
brand may already be sufficient. Second, understanding the
effectiveness of price reductions and promotions may
depend on the correct identification of unobserved compo-
nents that affect choices. Promotions may be much more
effective if there is true state dependence or choice set
effects than if there is habit or heterogeneity in preferences
(Erdem 1996; Keane 1997; Siddarth, Bucklin, and Morrison
1995). Third, misspecification of unobserved components
could very well produce misleading information on other
unobserved components. This is because key parameters
may adjust to compensate for the misspecification. For
example, Andrews and Manrai (1998b) and Abramson,
Buchmueller, and Currim (1998) report that the brand loy-
alty coefficient is larger and therefore state dependence is
exaggerated when choice set or brand preference hetero-
geneity is not modeled, even though predictive validity is
not seriously affected by the misspecification.
In this study, we use an extensive simulation to assess
parameter bias resulting from misspecified unobserved
components. The experimental factors manipulated include
state dependence, serial correlation, heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and responses to marketing mix, and choice set het-
erogeneity. Variation in these four factors produces a full-
factorial design with 81 data conditions. As discussed
previously, these effects have received much attention in the
literature in the past decade. However, no previous study has
performed an extensive, simultaneous analysis of these mis-
specified unobserved components.
As choice modelers move farther away from Guadagni
and Little’s (1983) original model, the work is becoming
more and more complex through incorporation of various
unobserved effects. Because of the potential for confound-
ing such effects, it is becoming progressively more difficult
to appreciate many new models: Each one seems to offer a
new methodological twist that is hard to compare with all
other approaches. It is unclear whether, in a collective sense,
modelers are making genuine progress. In this article, we
offer a step back to regain some perspective on today’s
choice models. In a sense, our objective is to investigate
which of today’s “bells and whistles” really contribute to
better parameter estimates and forecasting accuracy.
In the next section, we discuss the biases that we expect to
find in the simulation on the basis of econometric theory and
previous research. We then describe the simulation study, the
unobserved components selected, levels chosen for each com-
ponent, data sets simulated, and models estimated over each
data set. Subsequently, we outline the main findings from the
simulation study. Finally, we present implications for choice
modelers, limitations, and suggestions for further research.
EXPECTED EFFECTS
In general, econometric theory suggests that, when mod-
els are overspecified, estimators of the coefficients are unbi-
ased but inefficient (Kmenta 1986). Although we expect this
result to be true for overspecified unobserved components in
general, overspecification could lead to spurious effects if
there are other underspecified unobserved components, pos-
sibly resulting in severe parameter bias. Thus, overspecifi-
cation of some components may not cause parameter bias
unless there is underspecification of others.
Econometric theory shows that underspecification typi-
cally results in biased and inconsistent estimators, produc-
ing what is known as omitted variables bias. Under-
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specification of unobserved effects, similar to omitted vari-
ables, should have serious consequences for parameter bias.
According to the literature cited subsequently, underspecifi-
cation of state dependence, choice set effects, or hetero-
geneity is likely to produce spurious effects in other unob-
served components, which may exacerbate parameter bias.
However, underspecified serial correlation in residuals
should not affect bias in parameters (Kmenta 1986) if least
squares regression results hold in the case of qualitative
dependent variables.
Results from econometric theory might not apply to all
misspecified unobserved components, such as those investi-
gated in this study. If the results apply, it is unclear what the
magnitude or seriousness of the bias will be. If so, simula-
tion methods can supplement theoretical predictions on the
existence of bias with information on the magnitude of bias
that results in various misspecification conditions.
Empirical research suggests that it may be difficult for
choice models to identify correctly the underlying cause of
persistence in choices, which possibly results in spurious
habit, state dependence, preference heterogeneity, or choice
set effects.
Andrews and Manrai (1998b) focus on the consequences
of misspecified choice set heterogeneity in a simulated envi-
ronment. They show that spurious state dependence and
parameter bias result when choice set effects are underspec-
ified. Coefficients are biased toward zero unless the variable
is used in the screening of brands, in which case it is diffi-
cult to predict the direction of bias. Chintagunta,
Kyriazidou, and Perktold (1998) investigate the sensitivity
of various estimation methods to (1) the extent of preference
heterogeneity, (2) the correlation of individual heterogeneity
and exogenous control variables, and (3) the assumption of
exogeneity of the initial observations.
Most other studies use scanner-panel data to investigate
specification issues. Keane (1997) studies heterogeneity and
state dependence in the context of scanner-panel data. He
shows that there is evidence of state dependence in pur-
chases of ketchup even after a complex heterogeneity struc-
ture is controlled for. When heterogeneity is not controlled
for, the effect of state dependence for a brand purchased on
the previous occasion is roughly equivalent to a $.27 price
reduction on the current occasion. When various sources of
heterogeneity are controlled for, the effect of state depend-
ence is comparable to only a $.05 price reduction. The study
concludes that failing to control for heterogeneity exagger-
ates the degree of state dependence (see also Heckman
1981a, b).
Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan (1999), using scanner-
panel data, find that ignoring heterogeneity in choice sets
understates the impact of marketing-mix variables but over-
states the impact of preferences and past purchases. They
also provide some evidence that heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and market response is exaggerated when heterogene-
ity in choice sets is not controlled for. Roy, Chintagunta, and
Haldar (1996) find evidence of habit persistence (manifested
as serial correlation in the residuals) in ketchup data unless
state dependence and heterogeneity are controlled for. As in
Keane’s (1997) work, their study shows that ignoring het-
erogeneity exaggerates the extent of state dependence but
that there is still evidence of state dependence even when
heterogeneity is controlled for.
Our introduction section outlines how unobserved effects
due to choice sets, heterogeneity in preferences and market
response, and state dependence are conceptually related.
The studies reviewed in this section indicate that these unob-
served effects are empirically associated as well. Altogether,
this overview suggests that logit models will not be able to
distinguish the unobserved effects examined in this study.
SIMULATION STUDY
Data
This simulation experimentally varies four factors, each at
three levels. The factors are state dependence (smoothing
factor λ levels of 0, .75, and 1), serial correlation (correlation
coefficient ρ levels of 0, .45, and .90), heterogeneity (none,
discrete distributions for preference and market response
parameters, and continuous distributions for preference and
market response parameters), and choice set heterogeneity
(none, consumers form choice sets using Siddarth, Bucklin,
and Morrison’s [1995] promotion expansion strategy [SBM]
or Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker’s [1996] strategy [BV]).
All possible combinations of these four factors are investi-
gated, which results in a full-factorial design with 34 = 81
experimental conditions. Three data sets (replications) are
generated for each condition, which results in 243 data sets.
Each data set contains a total of 3000 purchases (1000 pur-
chases to be used for initialization of loyalty variables and
choice sets, 1000 to be used for model estimation, and 1000
to be used for model validation). Each data set is constructed
such that it contains 15 purchases from each of 200 con-
sumers: 5 purchases are used for initialization, 5 for estima-
tion, and 5 for validation. Overall, the simulation generates
3000 × 243 = 729,000 choices from 48,600 “consumers.”
The simulation assumes that consumers make choices from
a universal set that contains five brands. Two binary variables
intended to represent promotional activities (e.g., aisle dis-
play, store feature advertisement) and two normally distrib-
uted continuous variables (e.g., price, ad exposure) are gener-
ated to represent the attributes consumers use to make
choices. The two continuous variables are generated such that
the average correlations of the attributes across brands (e.g.,
the average correlation of price across brands) are a moderate
.30, which reflects some degree of similarity among brands.
The binary variables are generated such that they take values
of 1 about 10% of the time, comparable to the promotion fre-
quency observed in actual scanner-panel data applications.
Given the attribute data, the choices are generated. The
brand-specific constants αi are chosen such that, in the
absence of marketing-mix effects, the market shares of
Brands 1 through 5 are .10, .10, .15, .25, and .40, respec-
tively. These values are chosen to ensure that all brands have
enough choices in each data set to produce reliable estimates
of brand-specific constants. The four βk parameters are
assigned values of –1 (price), 1 (ad exposure), 5 (0/1 store
feature), and 4 (0/1 aisle display) for all data sets except
those containing market response heterogeneity.
Experimentation shows that the values chosen for the βk
parameters do not affect the conclusions drawn from the
simulation, though they do affect the fit of the models.
The state dependence factor varies the value of the
smoothing parameter λ across three levels: 0, .75, and 1.
State dependence is operationalized as the Guadagni–Little
(1983; GL) measure of brand loyalty:
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where BLhi, t is household h’s brand loyalty for brand i at occa-
sion t, initialized at t = 0 with equal values for all brands. The
values of λ used in the analysis encompass the range of
empirical estimates obtained in the literature. Studies using
lagged dependent variables (e.g., Roy, Chintagunta, and
Haldar 1996) assume first-order state dependence, which is
equivalent to a λ value of zero. Empirical evidence suggests
that the smoothing factor is usually closer to .75 (e.g.,
Guadagni and Little 1983). When λ = 1, the loyalty variable
indicates that there is no state dependence, which is equiva-
lent to assuming zero-order choice behavior (Bass 1993).
When λ = 0 or λ = .75, the importance weight for BLhi, t in the
utility function is set to 4, which is again consistent with
empirical estimates from prior research. When λ = 1, the
value of BLhi, t is the same for all brands (because it is initial-
ized that way), and the importance weight for BLhi, t does not
affect choice probabilities. We assume the true value to be
zero for purposes of calculating bias, because empirical mod-
els will recover a value of zero if they are operating properly.
The serial correlation factor has three levels: 0, .45, and
.90. Because it is not yet feasible to model serial correlation
in the residuals of logit models, the literature provides little
empirical evidence as to what levels of serial correlation are
realistic in scanner-panel data. Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar
(1996) find no evidence of serial correlation (suggesting a
value of zero), but they note that this finding is dependent on
the product category chosen. Keane’s (1997) probit model
produces estimates from .134 to .262, which are bracketed
well by our 0 and .45 conditions. We would not expect to find
negatively autocorrelated residuals in scanner-panel applica-
tions, so we investigate only positive serial correlation.
The heterogeneity factor has three levels: none, discrete
distributions for preferences and market response, and con-
tinuous distributions for preferences and market response.
When there is no heterogeneity, all consumers have the pref-
erence structure and response pattern described previously.
When there are discrete heterogeneity distributions, we
assume that each consumer belongs to one of two segments.
Each segment k has its own set of preferences αki, which
produces (in the absence of marketing-mix effects) market
shares of .10, .10, .15, .25, and .40 for Segment 1 and .40,
.25, .15, .10, and .10 for Segment 2. The response coeffi-
cients βki for Segment 1 are –1, 1, 5, and 4, and for Segment
2 are –5, 4, 1, and 2. Kamakura and Russell’s (1989) study,
on which this examination of latent-class heterogeneity is
based, reports comparable empirical differences between
segment parameters. Segment membership is determined
randomly, and each consumer has a 50% chance of belong-
ing to each segment.
When there are continuous heterogeneity distributions,
the coefficients are drawn from normal distributions with
means as described for Segment 1 previously. The standard
deviations of the coefficients are 1 for the preferences so that
households may prefer different brands. For the marketing-
mix coefficients (–1, 1, 5, and 4), the standard deviations are
.3, .3, 1, and 1. These were chosen so that the coefficients
( ) ( )
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0 otherwise,
would rarely, if ever, change signs. For example, we want
the price coefficient to be negative for all households.
The choice set heterogeneity factor has three levels: no
choice set formation, formation of choice sets using the SBM
promotion expansion strategy, and formation of choice sets
using the BV strategy. The promotion expansion strategy
assumes that consumers choose from one of three choice sets:
the full set of available brands, the set of previously purchased
brands, or the set of previously purchased brands augmented
by currently promoted brands. Applications of the promotion
expansion and similar models show usage of a choice set other
than the full set by 62% (detergent; Siddarth, Bucklin, and
Morrison 1995) and 73% (yogurt and detergent; Andrews and
Manrai 1998a) of consumers. Thus, we assume that 70% of
consumers choose from reduced choice sets, and the remaining
30% choose from the full set of available brands. Consumers
are assumed to use their assigned choice set formation strategy
consistently for the duration of their 15 purchases.
The third level of the choice set heterogeneity factor
assumes that consumers form choice sets using the BV strat-
egy, which calculates brand consideration probabilities πhit
that are then used to compute choice probabilities as
where Phit is the choice probability and v
h
it is the utility of
brand i for household h at t. To keep the information set
comparable to that of the promotion expansion model, we
generate brand consideration probabilities as a function of
past purchases and promotion as follows:
where Promit = 1 if brand i is promoted at t, 0 otherwise, and
Prevhit = 1 if household h has previously purchased brand i.
The consideration probabilities range from .12 to .88, which
would produce a choice set size distribution comparable to
that of Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker’s (1996) in-store sen-
sitive segment.
Models
The simulation fits nine models to each of the 243 data
sets. The nine models were chosen largely according to their
prominence in the choice modeling literature, though some
concession was made to practicality, given that the chosen
models would need to be estimated 243 times each. Model
1 is the zero-order logit model, which contains only brand-
specific constants and market response parameters. This
model is included because it underspecifies all four major
components examined in this study. With five brands used in
the simulation, we have four brand-specific constants (the
value of the fifth constant is fixed at zero, because only four
are identified) and four marketing-mix coefficients, for a
total of eight parameters per logit model.
Model 2 is the logit model with the GL specification of
the brand loyalty variable (see Equation 1) added to the util-
ity function. The brand loyalty variable is initialized with the
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fies heterogeneity in preferences and market response,
choice sets, and serial correlation but is specified to handle
state dependence correctly. With the two additional loyalty
parameters, ten parameters are required per logit model.
Model 3 is the logit model with Fader and Lattin’s (1993)
specification of the loyalty variable. Fader and Lattin’s study
presents an alternative measure of brand loyalty that is
intended to handle state dependence, heterogeneity, and
nonstationarity in preferences. However, Model 3 is not well
suited to first-order state dependence (λ = 0), so it may be
misspecified in this condition. In addition, Fader and
Lattin’s specification does not model heterogeneity in mar-
ket response, so we do not expect Model 3 to explain het-
erogeneity well either. Fader and Lattin’s loyalty variable is
included in the logit specification, which contains four
brand-specific constants and four marketing-mix coeffi-
cients. The total parameter count is 14.
The latent segment heterogeneity models Kamakura and
Russell (1989) describe estimate segment-specific prefer-
ence and market response parameters. Model 4 correctly
specifies heterogeneity in preferences and market response
but underspecifies state dependence, choice set effects, and
serial correlation. For the sake of computational feasibility,
we estimate models that have two latent segments. Each
model requires 8 parameters for each latent segment (as
detailed for the zero-order logit model previously) plus
another parameter that determines segment sizes, for a total
of 17 parameters for each model. Note that if two-segment
models outperform zero-order logit in any condition in
which there is no heterogeneity in preferences and market
response, there is no real need to estimate models with more
segments to demonstrate spurious effects.
Model 5 is the model with choice set heterogeneity, which
is based on the SBM promotion expansion model. Model 5
reflects the possibility that the consumer could use any of
three screening strategies to form choice sets on any given
purchase occasion. Consumers are assumed to consider (1)
only previously purchased brands, (2) previously purchased
brands augmented by currently promoted brands, or (3) all
available brands. Model 5 requires only two more parame-
ters than the zero-order logit model, for a total of ten. The
model correctly specifies heterogeneity in choice sets but
underspecifies state dependence, heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and market response, and serial correlation.
Model 6 is Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar’s (1996) model,
which is intended to explain heterogeneity in preferences
and market response, habit persistence (serial correlation),
and state dependence. Model 6 underspecifies choice set
effects. The utility function contains a lagged dependent
variable to explain state dependence, but the model will be
misspecified when the true state dependence is not first
order (i.e., when λ = .75). Brand-specific preference and
response parameters are handled with the latent-class for-
mulation, as in Kamakura and Russell’s (1989) models, to
account for heterogeneity. Habit persistence, which is
assumed to induce serial correlation in the residuals, is han-
dled by setting up a first-order reinforcement model for the
choice probabilities, conditional on the last purchase. The
serial correlation coefficient is not allowed to vary across
latent segments (see Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996),
and because there are two segments, Model 6 requires 20
parameters.
1For the brand loyalty coefficient, we analyze the estimated values of the
coefficient instead of bias, because it is not possible to compute the bias
measure when λ = 1. The true value of the loyalty coefficient is zero in this
condition, which necessitates division by zero.
Model 7 is the choice set model described previously
(Model 5) but with GL loyalty variables included in the util-
ity specification. Model 7 correctly specifies state depend-
ence and choice set effects but underspecifies heterogeneity
in preferences and market response and serial correlation.
The model requires 12 parameters.
Model 8 is the two-segment latent-class model described
previously (Model 4) but with segment-specific GL brand
loyalty variables. This adds 4 parameters (2 smoothing
parameters and 2 coefficients) to each model, for a total of
21. Model 8 underspecifies choice set heterogeneity and
serial correlation but correctly specifies state dependence
and heterogeneity in preferences and market response.
Model 9 is specified to explain heterogeneity in prefer-
ences and market response, state dependence, and choice set
effects, leaving only serial correlation underspecified. A
two-segment version adds 2 choice set parameters per seg-
ment to Model 8, resulting in a total of 25 parameters.
Model 9 is the most fully specified of the models, and we
expect that it will be the best-performing model of the
group.
This simulation does not estimate a model that correctly
specifies all four unobserved components, because experi-
mentation has shown that there is no acceptable technology
available for modeling the serial correlation component in
logit models. Also, this simulation does not investigate the
effectiveness of recently developed Bayesian models (e.g.,
Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan 1999) that require simula-
tion-based estimation methods because of the high degree of
computational effort required. The complete simulation
requires 2187 optimization runs.
SIMULATION RESULTS
The Effects of Misspecification: Regression Results
To analyze the effects of misspecification on parameter
bias, we use dummy-variable regression analysis. The bias
measure is computed as 100(bi – βi)/βi, where the hat indi-
cates a parameter estimate. Because the biases in prefer-
ences, market responses, and brand loyalty are often very
different, we use three bias measures—the average bias in
preference coefficients, the average bias in market response
coefficients, and the brand loyalty coefficient.1
When there is discrete heterogeneity in the data, there are
two sets of true coefficients, and when the model is latent
class (Models 4, 6, 8, and 9), there are two sets of estimated
coefficients, so special procedures must be used to compute
bias. First, we match estimated segments with true segments
on the basis of the highest percentage of correct allocation
of subjects to segments. For example, we compute the per-
centage of correct allocation when the first estimated seg-
ment (of which membership is determined by posterior
probabilities) is matched with the first true segment and
when the first estimated segment is matched with the second
true segment. Second, we use the matching that produces the
highest percentage of correct allocation to assign to each
consumer a true and an estimated vector of coefficients.
Third, using the assigned true and estimated vectors of coef-
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ficients, we compute the bias for each coefficient for each
consumer. Finally, we average the biases across consumers
and across variables to obtain the average bias for that
model–data set combination. When there is heterogeneity in
the data but not in the model, the estimated coefficients will
be the same for all consumers, whereas the true coefficients
vary across consumers. Likewise, when there is no hetero-
geneity in the data but the model is latent class, the true
coefficients will be the same for all consumers, whereas the
estimated coefficients (may) vary across consumers.
In Table 1, we show the regression results for three
dependent measures: percent bias in response coefficients,
percent bias in preference constants, and the estimated loy-
alty coefficients. For each factor (state dependence, serial
correlation, heterogeneity, and choice sets), the baseline
level corresponds to no effect. For example, the baseline
level of the state dependence factor is the one with λ = 1,
which corresponds to no state dependence. Table 1 shows
the main effects for each factor level as well as the interac-
tion of each level with model type. Model 1 (zero-order
logit) is the baseline model. Table 1 can be used to predict
the performance of a model given assumptions about the
effects likely to be found in the data (e.g., state dependence,
choice set effects).
As an example to aid interpretation, consider Table 1,
Panel A. To compute the predicted bias in response coeffi-
cients for Model 2 (Model 2, the logit model with GL loy-
alty) when there is λ = .75 state dependence, we add the
main and interaction effects for both the constant (–7 + 6)
and state dependence for λ = .75 (–18 + 19), which results
in a predicted bias of zero. Using Table 1, Panel A, the com-
putations showing the predicted biases in response coeffi-
cients for each of the correctly specified models is shown in
Table 2. Models 3 and 6 have no closely corresponding data
generation processes and therefore are excluded from the
computations. All models recover response parameters rea-
sonably well when correctly specified.
In the main effects column of Table 1, Panel A, we show
that underspecified state dependence produces significant
and serious bias in response coefficients. When state
dependence is first order (λ = 0), the baseline level of bias in
response coefficients is –40% (i.e., 40% underestimation),
whereas –18% bias results if the underspecified state
dependence is generated from λ = .75 (which is more likely
to be the case). Underspecified serial correlation does not
produce significant bias in response coefficients (–2% and
–7% for the ρ = .45 and ρ = .90 conditions). Underspecified
heterogeneity does not produce significant bias in response
coefficients either. However, underspecified choice sets, if
generated by the SBM promotion expansion strategy, gener-
ate significant bias in response coefficients (–27%).
Underspecified choice sets do not produce significant bias if
the sets are generated using the more compensatory BV
strategy. Thus, of the effects examined in this study, only
underspecified state dependence and choice sets produce
significant bias in response coefficients. 
In Table 1, Panel B, we show the regression analysis for
percent bias in preference constants. Correctly specified
models do well in some cases but not as well in others, as
the predicted values show (see Table 3). On the whole, mod-
els do not recover preference constants as well as they
recover market response parameters.
In the main effects column of Table 1, Panel B, we show
that significant bias in preference constants results only from
underspecified discrete heterogeneity—and this bias is an
astounding –105%. Underspecified choice set effects of the
SBM variety produce an estimated –24% bias, but the bias is
not statistically significant (t = –1.3). Thus, state dependence
and choice set effects produce bias in response coefficients,
and heterogeneity produces bias in preference constants,
whereas serial correlation produces bias in neither.
In Table 1, Panel C, we show the regression analysis for
the loyalty coefficients. Only Models 2, 7, 8, and 9 have loy-
alty coefficients. The predicted loyalty coefficients for the
models, when correctly specified, are given in Table 4.
Note that the true loyalty coefficient is 4.0 for λ = .75.
Models 2 and 7 do a reasonable job of recovering the loyalty
coefficient when correctly specified, but Models 8 and 9 do
less well. Indeed, Model 8 recovers the loyalty coefficient
poorly. Perhaps the explanation for the relatively poor
recovery of the loyalty coefficient for Models 8 and 9 is that
those models are designed to recover heterogeneity.
In the main effects column of Table 1, Panel C, we show
that state dependence significantly increases the loyalty
coefficient, as we expected. Serial correlation at ρ = .90 pro-
duces significant positive bias (1.39) in the size of the loy-
alty coefficient. Also, underspecified heterogeneity (whether
continuous or discrete) produces negative (though insignifi-
cant) bias (–.71 and –.72) in the size of the loyalty coeffi-
cient. Conventional wisdom holds that underspecified het-
erogeneity would be explained as state dependence, which
produces positive bias in the loyalty coefficient (Keane
1997; Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996). Our study does
not support this finding. Underspecified choice sets (of the
SBM variety) produce significant bias in the loyalty coeffi-
cient (1.36).
To summarize the regression analyses, underspecified
state dependence produces significant bias (–40% for λ = 0,
–18% for λ = .75) in response coefficients. Underspecified
serial correlation increases the value of the loyalty coeffi-
cient (by 1.39). Underspecified discrete heterogeneity pro-
duces significant bias (–105%) in preference constants but
does not increase the value of the loyalty coefficient, as is
commonly held. Underspecified continuous heterogeneity
produces comparatively minor problems. Whether the true
coefficients have continuous or discrete distributions in real-
world applications is unknown, though some researchers
have suggested that the assumption of discrete heterogene-
ity distributions is not realistic (Allenby, Arora, and Ginter
1998). Underspecified choice sets, if generated by the SBM
promotion expansion strategy, produce significant bias in
response coefficients (–27%), large but insignificant bias in
preference constants (–24%), and a significant increase in
loyalty coefficients (1.36). In contrast, choice sets produced
by the BV strategy produce no significant biases. Whether
true choice sets are generated by promotion expansion
screening strategies or compensatory analyses in real-world
applications is unknown, though there is much more evi-
dence that choice sets are formed through a noncompen-
satory screening such as that described by Siddarth,
Bucklin, and Morrison (1995; see also Andrews and Manrai
1998a).
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Table 1
REGRESSION RESULTS: PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND t–VALUES.
A: Percent Bias in Response Coefficients (R2 = .30, n = 2187)
Interactions by Model Type
Effect Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant –7 –.8 6 .5 8 .6 10 .7 8 .6 40 3.0 11 .8 34 2.5 58 4.3
State: λ = 0 –40 –5.1 29 2.6 24 2.2 –3 –.2 –6 –.5 101 9.2 26 2.3 43 3.9 66 6.0
State: λ = .75 –18 –2.3 19 1.7 12 1.0 1 .1 3 .3 7 .6 17 1.5 20 1.8 39 3.5
Serial: ρ = .45 –2 –.3 2 .2 1 .1 0 .0 1 .1 –11 –1.0 2 .2 13 1.2 –11 –1.0
Serial: ρ = .90 –7 –1.0 15 1.3 8 .7 2 .2 3 .3 1 .1 15 1.4 15 1.4 25 2.3
Heterogeneity: 
discrete 9 1.2 –10 –.9 –7 –.6 –8 –.7 0 .0 –43 –3.9 –11 –1.0 –34 –3.1 –70 –6.3
Heterogeneity: 
continuous –8 –1.0 –11 –1.0 –8 –.7 –3 –.2 –5 –.4 –9 –.8 –14 –1.3 –13 –1.1 –46 –4.1
Choice set: 
SBM –27 –3.5 8 .7 8 .7 –1 –.1 22 2.0 –23 –2.1 24 2.1 2 .2 29 2.6
Choice set: 
BV –4 –.5 3 .3 3 .3 –1 –.1 4 .3 6 .6 5 .5 –12 –1.1 4 .4
B: Percent Bias in Preference Constants (R2 = .39, n = 2187)
Interactions by Model Type
Effect Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0 .0 –18 –.6 –93 –2.9 4 .1 2 .0 41 1.3 –8 –.2 –22 –.7 66 2.1
State: λ = 0 –1 –.1 3 .1 –369 –14.1 2 .1 –9 –.4 43 1.6 –2 –.1 84 3.2 55 2.1
State: λ = .75 12 .6 –7 –.3 –3 –.1 8 .3 0 .0 –6 –.2 –10 –.4 –2 –.1 26 1.0
Serial: ρ = .45 0 .0 1 .0 –30 –1.1 –6 –.2 –1 .0 –12 –.5 –1 –.1 34 1.3 –55 –2.1
Serial: ρ = .90 –5 –.2 –1 .0 –40 –1.5 –1 .0 –4 –.1 –32 –1.2 –4 –.1 0 .0 –26 –1.0
Heterogeneity: 
discrete –105 –5.7 23 .9 210 8.0 103 3.9 –2 –.1 67 2.6 11 .4 71 2.7 12 .5
Heterogeneity: 
continuous –12 –.6 0 .0 67 2.6 2 .1 –3 –.1 9 .3 –4 –.1 38 1.5 –50 –1.9
Choice set: SBM –24 –1.3 –2 –.1 47 1.8 –26 –1.0 16 .6 –46 –1.8 12 .5 –2 –.1 19 .7
Choice set: BV –3 –.2 0 .0 6 .2 1 .0 2 .1 –2 –.1 2 .1 –17 –.7 19 .7
C: Estimated Loyalty Coefficient (R2 = .25, n = 972)
Interactions by Model Type
Effect Model 2 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 1.64 2.0 0 –.50 –.4 –1.47 –1.3 –.36 –.3
State: λ = 0 1.51 2.2 0 .60 .6 3.01 3.1 3.76 3.9
State: λ = .75 1.97 2.9 0 .57 .6 .50 .5 1.90 2.0
Serial: ρ = .45 .24 .4 0 .09 .1 1.78 1.9 .00 .0
Serial: ρ = .90 1.39 2.0 0 .27 .3 1.23 1.3 2.32 2.4
Heterogeneity: discrete –.71 –1.0 0 –.21 –.2 –.62 –.6 –1.96 –2.0
Heterogeneity: continuous –.72 –1.1 0 –.10 –.1 1.69 1.8 –1.51 –1.6
Choice set: SBM 1.36 2.0 0 –1.38 –1.4 2.11 2.2 –.81 –.8
Choice set: BV .45 .7 0 –.24 –.3 –.48 –.5 .04 .0
Notes: Model 1: zero-order logit; Model 2: logit with GL (1983) loyalty; Model 3: logit with Fader–Lattin (1993) loyalty; Model 4: heterogeneity in pref-
erences and market response (Kamakura and Russell 1989); Model 5: heterogeneity in choice sets (Siddarth, Bucklin, and Morrison 1995); Model 6: habit,
state dependence, and heterogeneity (Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996); Model 7: choice set Model 5 with GL loyalty; Model 8: heterogeneity Model 4
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Table 2
PREDICTED BIASES IN RESPONSE COEFFICIENTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant –7 –1 3 1 4 27 51
State: λ = .75 1 –1 2 21
Heterogeneity: discrete 1 –25 –61
Choice set: SBM –5 –3 2
Table 3
PREDICTED BIASES IN PREFERENCE CONSTANTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0 –18 4 2 –8 –22 66
State: λ = .75 5 2 10 38
Heterogeneity: discrete –2 –34 –93
Choice set: SBM –8 –12 –5
Predicted bias 0 –13 2 –6 –18 –46 6
Table 4
PREDICTED LOYALTY COEFFICIENTS
Model 2 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 1.64 1.14 .17 1.28
State: λ = .75 1.97 2.54 2.47 3.87
Heterogeneity: discrete –1.33 –2.67
Choice set: SBM –.02 .55
Predicted coefficient 3.61 3.66 1.31 3.03
2BIC = –2log L + pln(n), where log L is the value of the maximized log-
likelihood function from the estimation sample, p is the number of param-
eters required, and n is the sample size.
Means and Standard Deviations by Model Type and
Experimental Condition
In Table 5, we show the means and standard deviations of
the experimental factors shown to be most important in
Table 1, namely, models (Panel A), choice sets (Panel B),
heterogeneity (Panel C), and state dependence (Panel D).
We show the means not only for preference, market
response, and loyalty but also for two key predictive criteria
(Bayesian information criterion [BIC]2 and the prediction
log-likelihood). Italics indicate our assessment of the best
model for each data condition.
In Panel A of Table 5, we show that Model 9 (with state
dependence, heterogeneity, and choice set effects) has the
best predictive validity of all models when averaged across
all 81 experimental conditions. Although Model 9 has the
best predictive validity, Model 7 (with state dependence and
choice set effects) has the most appealing coefficient bias
(taking variance into account). Notice that the standard
deviations of the biases in coefficients are at least four times
as high for Model 9 as for Model 7. The true loyalty coeffi-
cient for Table 5, Panel A, should be 4(2/3) + 0(1/3) = 8/3 =
2.67, because two-thirds of the data conditions have a loy-
alty coefficient of four and the remaining one-third (corre-
sponding to λ = 1) have a loyalty coefficient of zero. Model
7 also does the best job of recovering the loyalty coefficient,
with an average estimate of 2.83 (a bias of only 6%). Model
4 (with heterogeneity only) has good bias numbers (espe-
cially preference), but because the model’s predictive accu-
racy is far out of the range of the best models, we cannot rec-
ommend it is a best model. It is a bit shocking that the model
with the best overall bias numbers has an average bias of
–53% in preference coefficients. As we discuss subse-
quently, most of this bias is due to underspecified discrete
heterogeneity.
Thus, Model 9 has the best overall predictive accuracy,
and Model 7 has the best overall parameter estimates.
Superior predictive validity does not necessarily imply supe-
rior parameter bias, as is commonly assumed in empirical
applications in the literature.
In Table 5, Panel B, we show the interaction of model
type and choice set usage. Model 8 has the best predictive
validity when there are no choice set effects (Model 9 is
overspecified in this condition). However, Model 9 has the
best predictive validity when choice sets are generated
according to the SBM model, as we would expect. The SBM
model formulation apparently does not explain choice set
effects generated according to Bronnenberg and
Vanhonacker (1996), as Model 8 performs better than Model
9 in the BV choice set usage condition.
From Table 5, Panel B, it is apparent that Models 2 and 7
have nearly identical performance when there are no choice
set effects. This is strong evidence that Model 7 has no spu-
rious choice set effects when there are truly no choice set
effects in the data. Model 7 also has the best parameter bias
when the choice sets are generated according to the SBM
model. As before, the standard deviations of the biases for
latent-class Models 8 and 9 are high. However, Model 8 has
surprisingly good parameter bias figures in the BV choice
set usage condition.
Also note in Table 5, Panel B, the average loyalty coeffi-
cient for Model 2 when there are no choice set effects (2.86)
and when there are SBM choice set effects (4.22). The loy-
alty coefficient is biased because of the underspecified
choice set effects, as is suggested in Table 1, Panel C. The
magnitude of bias (4.22 – 2.86 = 1.36) is exactly the same
as is predicted in the “Choice set: SBM” row in Table 1,
Panel C. Likewise, the estimated loyalty coefficient for
Model 8 is 3.92 when there are no choice set effects and
7.39 when there are SBM choice set effects, a difference of
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3.47. This is again the bias predicted by Table 1, Panel C
(1.36 + 2.11 = 3.47). More generally, the between-condition
differences among all three measures (preference, market
response, and loyalty) in Table 5, Panels B, C, and D, can be
reproduced by examining the regression models in Table 1,
Panels A, B, and C.
In Table 5, Panel C, we show the means for model type by
heterogeneity condition. Model 7 has the best predictive
validity when there is no heterogeneity, as we would expect.
Model 9 has the best predictive validity when there is dis-
crete heterogeneity, also as expected. However, Model 7 has
the best predictive validity when there is continuous hetero-
geneity, which implies that latent-class models (e.g., Model
9) are not effective in recovering continuous heterogeneity
distributions. This pattern of model performance also holds
up with parameter bias: Model 7 is best in the no-hetero-
geneity and continuous-heterogeneity conditions, and
Model 9 best in the discrete-heterogeneity condition. The
models with underspecified discrete heterogeneity (e.g.,
Models 2, 5, and 7) have greater than 100% biases in pref-
erence constants. This is consistent with the regression
results in Table 1, Panel B.
Comparing Models 2 and 8 in the no-heterogeneity con-
dition in Table 5, Panel C, we note that there are spurious
heterogeneity effects in some conditions, because these two
models do not produce the same results. If there were no
spurious heterogeneity effects, Models 2 and 8 would pro-
duce the same results in the no-heterogeneity condition, as
Models 2 and 7 did in the no-choice-set-effects condition in
Table 5, Panel B. Although the BIC value is not lower for
Model 8 than for Model 2 in the no-heterogeneity condition,
the parameter biases for the two models are very different,
which indicates that the two models do not find the same
solutions.
In Table 5, Panel D, we show the means and standard
deviations by state dependence condition. When state
dependence is first order (λ = 0), Model 6 (Roy,
Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996) has the best fit. This is the
only model equipped with a lagged dependent variable,
which is the most parsimonious and most effective way to
model first-order state dependence. However, the parameter
biases for Model 6 in this condition have much larger stan-
dard deviations than some other models. For the most typi-
cal state dependence condition (λ = .75), Model 9 has the
best predictive validity, and Model 7 has the best parameter
bias. The average loyalty coefficient for Model 7 is 3.83,
which is close to its true value of 4.00. When there is no state
dependence (λ = 1), Model 9 again has the best predictive
validity (despite overspecifying the state dependence), and
Model 7 again has the best overall parameter bias. Notice
that the average loyalty coefficient for Model 7 is 1.29, com-
pared with the true value of zero in this condition. This is
because the presence of serial correlation in some conditions
inflates the loyalty coefficient. Model 2 has an even larger
loyalty coefficient (2.31), because it underspecifies serial
correlation and choice sets, both of which produce positive
bias in the loyalty coefficient when underspecified.
In summary, we show in Table 5 that the logit model with
choice set effects and GL loyalty (Model 7) has the best
overall parameter bias numbers across data conditions,
whereas Model 9 (latent-class logit with GL loyalty and
choice sets) is best in terms of predictive validity. However,
there is evidence that Model 9 achieves its stellar predictive
performance (and not-so-stellar parameter bias variances)
by means of spurious effects, which we examine more
closely in the next section.
Analysis of Spurious Effects
In Table 6, we show fit and prediction statistics (Panel A)
and the bias in parameters (Panel B) for each model fit to
selected data conditions. The boldface text in each column
indicates the correct model for the data condition a priori;
italics indicate the best model according to predictive valid-
ity. Of the 81 experimental conditions, we examine only 6 of
the conditions in Table 6 to determine the degree of spurious
effects in choice models. There are three replications in each
cell, so the numbers in Table 6 are averages across the three
replications. In contrast, the results of Table 1 are based on
the entire experimental design containing three replications
in each of 81 cells.
When the data contain no effects, the zero-order logit
model is preferred according to BIC, as we would expect.
Although there is no strong evidence of spurious effects in
this condition, we note that the latent-class models did not
appear to find the same solution as the homogeneous mod-
els. The validation log-likelihood is slightly lower for the
latent-class models. None of the models (with the possible
exception of Model 3) shows serious parameter bias.
When the data contain only state dependence (λ = .75),
Model 2 is the preferred model. Model 2 has the best BIC
value and the best log-likelihood value (shared with Model
7, which nests Model 2 and finds approximately the same
solutions). The parameter bias averages 5% for the prefer-
ence constants and 3% for the market response coefficients,
and the average loyalty coefficient is 3.58 (–10.5% bias).
Model 8 nests Model 2 and should find the same solution in
the absence of heterogeneity, but it does not. This suggests
some spurious heterogeneity, though not enough that BIC
favors Model 8 over Model 2. Model 8 overspecifies hetero-
geneity in preferences and market response, but the loyalty
coefficient is biased substantially (52.75%) upward. We
might expect spurious heterogeneity to explain some of the
state dependence, thereby producing downward bias in the
loyalty coefficient. This finding does not hold for Model 9,
so we refrain from attempting to draw conclusions.
Also in data condition 2, Models 4 and 5 (heterogeneity
and choice sets, both without GL loyalty) fit better than the
logit model without GL loyalty (Model 1), which suggests
spurious effects. However, the spurious choice set effects
disappear when the GL loyalty variable is included (com-
pare BIC for Models 2 and 7), as do the spurious hetero-
geneity effects (compare BIC for Models 2 and 8). Thus, it
is important that heterogeneity and choice set components
not be included in models unless there is a GL loyalty vari-
able. It is common practice in the literature to model hetero-
geneity but not state dependence (Chintagunta 1994; Dillon
et al. 1994; Kamakura and Russell 1989), but this study does
not support that practice.
When there is only serial correlation (data condition 3),
we expect Model 6 to be best because it is intended to
model serial correlation, but this is not the case. Model 2
has the best fit and predictive accuracy, though state
dependence is grossly overstated because of the serial cor-
relation (the true coefficient is zero, whereas the average
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estimated coefficient is 3.17). Model 7 finds the same solu-
tion as Model 2, which indicates no spurious choice set
effects, but Model 8 does not, which is again indicative of
some spurious heterogeneity.
In data condition 4, there is discrete heterogeneity. Model
4 is correctly specified and is the preferred model. The
parameter bias figures are good (16% for preference con-
stants, 9% for response coefficients). Model 2, which mod-
els state dependence but underspecifies heterogeneity, esti-
mates a brand loyalty coefficient of .74 (when the true value
is zero). However, the loyalty variable does not significantly
improve the fit of the model (compare BICs for Models 1
and 2). This is consistent with Table 1, Panel C, which shows
that underspecified heterogeneity has no significant effect
on the loyalty coefficient. This finding again suggests that
there is not likely to be spurious state dependence when het-
erogeneity is underspecified. Previous research (e.g., Keane
1997; Roy, Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996) suggests that
underspecified heterogeneity exaggerates state dependence,
but this is contrary to our findings. Our study suggests that
the elaborate heterogeneity structures used in those studies
were instead explaining what was truly state dependence. In
any case, the finding that the GL loyalty measure does not
significantly exaggerate state dependence when there is
underspecified heterogeneity is new and important, and it
reflects positively on the use of the GL loyalty measure.
The small amount of bias in response coefficients when
heterogeneity is underspecified deserves some mention.
This result may be conservative. When there is discrete het-
erogeneity in data and a homogeneous logit model is esti-
mated, the estimated coefficients are roughly averages of the
segment-specific coefficients (each segment contains
roughly 50% of the sample). For example, if the segments
have true coefficients 1 and 5 (notice that both coefficients
have the same sign), as is the case for one of the marketing-
mix variables, the estimated coefficient may be near three.
One segment will have a positive bias, and the other will
have a negative bias. The biases will at least partially offset
each other when averaged across consumers. After averag-
ing these biases across four predictors, the average bias
across segments may be near zero. In contrast to the small
biases for market response coefficients, biases for the pref-
erence constants were much larger. Consider another exam-
ple in which the true coefficients of the two segments have
opposite signs (say, –2 and 2), as the preference constants
did. No matter what the value of the estimated coefficient,
the bias will be near –100%. The biases near zero for
response coefficients and the biases near 100% for prefer-
ence constants for the underspecified models in data condi-
tion 4 therefore may be heavily dependent on the true
parameter values chosen for the analysis. Regardless, the
analysis indicates that severe parameter bias is possible
when there is underspecified discrete heterogeneity. We
would not be comfortable assuming that underspecified dis-
crete heterogeneity produces no bias in response coeffi-
cients. It must produce bias at the individual level, though it
may not be apparent after averaging across consumers and
predictors, depending on the true values of the coefficients.
Data in condition 5 contain promotion expansion (SBM)
choice set formation. As expected, Model 5 is preferred in
this condition. Parameter biases for this model are reason-
able, but not excellent (–22% for preference constants and
–2% for market response coefficients). When choice set
usage is underspecified and state dependence is overspeci-
fied (Model 2), the GL loyalty variable grossly exaggerates
the degree of state dependence, with an estimated coefficient
of 3.44 and a true value of zero. However, Model 7 (which
contains a loyalty variable) finds the same solution as Model
5, with a loyalty coefficient estimate of zero, so choice set
usage and state dependence are not likely to be confused if
both are modeled. There also appears to be spurious hetero-
geneity when choice sets are underspecified (compare BICs
for Models 1 and 4).
Data condition 6 combines state dependence (λ = .75),
serial correlation (ρ = .90), discrete heterogeneity, and SBM
choice set usage. This data condition represents the worst-
case scenario for applied choice modelers. There is no a pri-
ori best model for these data, because all models are under-
specified. Model 9 is the best overall model according to BIC,
and it has the lowest bias in preference constants. Notice that,
even with the best model, some of the biases are high in this
condition: –40% for preference constants, 20% for market
response parameters, and 42.5% for the loyalty coefficient.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
We summarize the main findings of this study as follows:
First, underspecified choice set effects may result in sub-
stantial bias. Bias in market response parameters resulting
from underspecified promotion expansion (Siddarth,
Bucklin, and Morrison 1995) choice set effects was –27%,
whereas bias in preference constants was –24% (though not
significant), and the brand loyalty coefficient increases by
1.36. No serious bias resulted when choice set effects were
generated using the more compensatory strategy suggested
by Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker (1996). However, the bulk
of empirical evidence at this juncture suggests that true
choice set effects are more likely to involve noncompen-
satory screening such as that suggested by Siddarth,
Bucklin, and Morrison (1995). Overspecified choice set
effects did not produce any bias in any data condition.
Second, underspecified heterogeneity in preferences and
market response results in significant parameter bias if there
are discrete segments of consumers. Our analysis showed
–105% bias in preference constants when the heterogeneity
is underspecified. However, biases in response coefficients
(9%) and the loyalty coefficient (a .71 decrease in the coef-
ficient) were not statistically significant, though the result
for response coefficients may be conservative. When the dis-
tribution of coefficients is assumed to be normal (not dis-
crete), the bias resulting from underspecification is not sig-
nificant. Whether real-world applications have discrete or
continuous distributions of preferences therefore becomes a
crucial question, one in need of research. At this time, how-
ever, there is some speculation that the assumption of dis-
crete heterogeneity distributions may not be realistic. Over-
specification of heterogeneity results in spurious
heterogeneity effects, especially when other components
(e.g., state dependence, choice sets) are underspecified.
Third, underspecified state dependence has serious conse-
quences for bias in response coefficients and fit. When state
dependence was first order, we observed a –40% bias in
response coefficients. When state dependence was generated
with the commonly indicated value of λ = .75, bias in
response coefficients was –18%.
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Fourth, underspecification of serial correlation has seri-
ous consequences only at extreme levels (ρ = .90) and only
for the loyalty coefficient. Presence of serial correlation
caused the loyalty coefficient to be inflated by 1.39. There
was no bias in preference constants or market response
parameters. Therefore, there seems to be less incentive to
build models to control for serial correlation in residuals.
Fifth, the logit model with choice set effects and GL loy-
alty has the best overall parameter bias. Latent-class logit
models with GL loyalty and choice set effects produced the
best fit and forecasting performance of any models.
Unfortunately, the parameter biases for the latter models had
high variation, partially as a result of their tendency to pro-
duce spurious effects. High variation in biases is undesirable
because it indicates that sometimes the model estimates a
drastically wrong solution.
Sixth, underspecified state dependence results in spurious
heterogeneity, but underspecified heterogeneity does not
result in exaggerated state dependence. On the contrary, our
regression model estimates that underspecified heterogene-
ity causes the loyalty coefficient to be understated, though
not significantly so. Spurious heterogeneity was less of a
problem when the GL loyalty variable was included in the
specification, though it did not disappear completely. It is
therefore important that the GL loyalty variable be included
in heterogeneity models. It is common practice in the litera-
ture to model heterogeneity and not state dependence, but
this results in spurious heterogeneity.
Seventh, underspecified choice set effects result in exag-
gerated state dependence, and underspecified state depend-
ence results in spurious choice set effects. However, choice
set models with GL loyalty do not have difficulty distin-
guishing choice set effects from other unobserved effects.
Without the GL loyalty variable, choice set effects and state
dependence may be confused.
Eighth, underspecified choice set effects result in exag-
gerated heterogeneity, but underspecified heterogeneity
does not result in spurious choice set effects. The model
intended to account for both heterogeneity and choice set
effects (Model 9) did not recover parameters as well as
expected, though the fit of the model was excellent.
Ninth, the GL loyalty measure recovered state depend-
ence well in all conditions. It does not exaggerate state
dependence when there is underspecified heterogeneity, as
is commonly conjectured. However, the GL loyalty variable
exaggerates state dependence when there is underspecified
choice set usage or serial correlation.
Tenth, when correctly specified, most models recover
parameters reasonably well. However, when there are multi-
ple unobserved effects present in the data, even the most
suitable models have difficulty recovering parameters. For
example, when there were state dependence effects, serial
correlation, discrete heterogeneity, and SBM choice set
effects present in the data, even the best model (Model 9)
had a –40% bias in preferences, a 20% bias in response
coefficients, and a 43% bias in the loyalty coefficient. This
level of bias may or may not be acceptable given the objec-
tive of the study. There is certainly room for improvement.
Eleventh, in general, it is difficult to infer parameter bias
on the basis of predictive accuracy. The correlation matrix of
four of the measures across experimental conditions is shown
in Table 7. For example, across experimental conditions, the
correlation of BIC and bias in market response coefficients is
–.3698. That BIC and log-likelihood are negatively correlated
makes sense because we prefer small values of BIC and large
values of log-likelihood. It would be particularly difficult to
predict bias in preference constants on the basis of BIC or
log-likelihood. Thus, it may not be sufficient to infer param-
eter bias (or lack thereof) on the basis of a model’s fit and
forecasting capability. Spurious effects often result in excel-
lent fit but poor parameter estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we report the results of a large-scale simu-
lation experiment. The major goals were to assess the
parameter bias of today’s commonly used choice models
and to assess the potential for obtaining spurious state
dependence, heterogeneity in preferences and market
response, serial correlation, and choice set effects when
these models are used.
The first major conclusion is that examination of parame-
ter bias provides some important insights beyond those pro-
vided by the traditional predictive validity approach to
model selection. We encountered cases in which traditional
model selection criteria such as BIC chose models with
extremely poor parameter bias, and vice versa. In general,
correlations between measures of parameter bias and pre-
dictive validity were low. This finding emphasizes the
importance of using simulation methods to verify that new
models are indeed recovering the values of known parame-
ters instead of relying only on predictive validity in a scan-
ner-panel data setting. It is our contention that simulation
methods and scanner data analysis both provide essential
information for choosing appropriate models and that nei-
ther is adequate if used alone.
A second major conclusion is that the potential for param-
eter bias in choice model applications appears to be high.
Underspecifying state dependence, heterogeneity, and
choice set effects can result in substantial parameter bias.
Overspecifying heterogeneity introduces the possibility of
spurious heterogeneity effects and significant parameter
bias, especially when other components are underspecified.
A third major group of results sometimes confirms and
sometimes contradicts conventional wisdom about the
effects of spurious effects in choice models. For example,
underspecified state dependence results in spurious hetero-
Table 7
CORRELATION MATRIX ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Preference Bias Response Bias BIC Validation Log-Likelihood
Preference bias 1.0000
Response bias .3512 1.0000
BIC –.0169 –.3698 1.0000
Validation log-likelihood .0444 .3626 –.9582 1.0000
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geneity, but underspecified heterogeneity does not result in
exaggerated state dependence. Likewise, underspecified
choice set effects result in spurious heterogeneity, but under-
specified heterogeneity does not result in spurious choice set
effects. However, underspecified choice set effects result in
exaggerated state dependence, and vice versa. One finding
was that spurious effects are minimized by including a GL
loyalty variable in all model specifications. In general, the
GL loyalty specification was shown to perform well in a
variety of settings, despite frequent criticism of the construct
in the literature.
In addition, the regression models in Table 1 can be used to
decide which model to use, given a set of assumptions about
the likely effects in the data. For example, if the researcher
believes that there are state dependence and choice set effects
in the data, Table 1 can be used to predict the likely biases in
preference constants, market response parameters, and the
loyalty coefficient for each of the models. The model with the
most appealing biases could then be used to model the data.
Thus, the study can be used to make specific recommenda-
tions regarding model specification. In general, logit models
with choice sets and GL-type loyalty variables have the best
parameter bias under a wide range of circumstances. Another
finding is that models with latent-class heterogeneity obtain
the correct solution with much less certainty than other mod-
els, though their predictive validity is excellent. More work
must be done to improve the coefficient estimates for such
models. The study suggests that GL loyalty variables should
always be included in choice models unless there is no chance
of state dependence. Finally, serial correlation in the error
terms produces bias only in the loyalty coefficient, so research
in this area probably does not have a strong justification.
Finally, this study suggests some possible modeling strate-
gies that can reduce the potential for biases and spurious
effects. As discussed previously, combining simulation meth-
ods and scanner data methods has great appeal. For a typical
new model study, researchers could use the scanner data as
the basis for generating artificial choices. The choices would
be generated such that they contain known components
(including data with and without the new component being
modeled), and the new model could be applied along with
several carefully selected benchmark models. The new model
must be shown to have acceptable parameter bias before it is
applied to actual scanner data. The results of the scanner data
analysis can also be compared with those of the simulation
analysis to look for common patterns in the findings.
Given the important role of simulation in model specifi-
cation issues, there are surely other important factors that
affect parameter bias and predictive validity. First, the per-
formance of models with continuous distributions for coef-
ficients is in need of study. Perhaps some of the findings
observed for the models in this study would not hold for
such models. Second, frequency of promotions, brand pref-
erence concentration, correlation between independent vari-
ables, and parametric versus semiparametric model specifi-
cations, among others, should be investigated. Third, in the
context of latent-class models, the effects of total sample
size; distribution of consumers in segments; and distribution
of heterogeneity on parameter bias, prediction accuracy, and
percentage of correct allocation of subjects to segments
could be investigated. Fourth, another important issue,
which may require both simulated data and actual data, is
the nature of heterogeneity in scanner-panel applications.
Our study suggests that the proper modeling strategy
depends on whether heterogeneity is continuous or discrete.
Perhaps coefficient distributions are multimodal. We hope
our work will motivate such efforts.
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